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Abstract
This work is an exposure assessment for a population living in
an area contaminated by use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons.
RESRAD 5.91 code is used to evaluate the average effective dose
delivered from 1, 10, 20 cm depths of contaminated soil, in a resi-
dential farmer scenario. Critical pathway and group are identified in
soil inhalation or ingestion and children playing with the soil, respec-
tively. From available information on DU released on targeted sites,
both critical and average exposure can leave to toxicological hazards;
annual dose limit for population can be exceeded on short-term pe-
riod (years) for soil inhalation. As a consequence, in targeted sites
cleaning up must be planned on the basis of measured concentration,
when available, while special cautions have to be adopted altogether
to reduce unaware exposures, taking into account the amount of the
avertable dose.
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1 Introduction
Munitions containing depleted uranium (DU) have been used by NATO and
US forces during the war operations in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1994), Kosovo
and Serbia (1999). Recently some information on 112 sites targeted by DU
weapons in Kosovo has been supplied by NATO to the United Nation En-
vironmental Program Balkans Task Force (UNEP BTF); on November 2000
measurements to detect contamination have been undertaken by a UNEP
team in 11 among the 112 sites.
Aim of this paper is outlining some aspects of the exposure of people
living in an area contaminated by DU, on the basis of official available infor-
mation and of simulations, looking for main pathways of average and critical
exposure.
Individuation of pathways of high exposure could allow to advice to popu-
lation; average dose assessment, together with measures of DU concentration
in soil, will make delimitation of areas to be cleaned up possible.
2 Military use of depleted uranium
The Gulf war against Iraq in 1991 was the first one known where DU rounds
have been used in large quantity (approximately 300 tonnes) [1, 2]. The
consequences on the health of the Iraqi population and of the US veterans
are still under study. DU exposure at the moment is not considered the most
probable cause of the Gulf War Syndrome experienced by hundreds thousand
veterans [3]; on the other hand, the effects of the DU left over the Iraqi
territory are difficult to show, due to the large number of toxic substances
dispersed in the environment during the war and the deterioration of the
sanitary situation caused by the embargo to which the country is submitted
from 1991 (cited work in [4], app.3).
Reports on potential effects on human health and environment from the
use of DU have appeared during the last years: studies on risk assessment
for the Jefferson Proving Ground, a US facility for testing DU munitions,
have been performed [5]; the risk for population for the Kosovo conflict and
for the Gulf war has been also considered [4, 6].
DU can be obtained as by-product in the enrichment process of natural
uranium for the production of nuclear fuel and for military applications; as
2
the ore extracted natural uranium, DU is associated to a reduced chain of
radioactive isotopes, formed by 238U and 235U decay products having shorter
decay times: 234Th (24 days), 234mPa (1.17 min) and 234Pa (6.7 hours), 231
Th(25.5 hours). DU can also be obtained by the reprocessing of nuclear
power plant spent fuel, and so traces of transuranic elements and 236U can
be present. According to official information, DU used by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defence contains approximately 0.2% of 235U and traces of 234U ,
236U . Following the indications in [7, 8], we will assume the uranium iso-
topic composition of DU given in Table 1. DU specific activity is in part due
Table 1: Assumed depleted uranium composition. Ai is the specific isotopic
activity, ADU is the activity concentration per mg of DU.
% T1/2 Ai ADU
(y) (Bq/mg) (Bq/mg)
238U 99.796 4.5 109 12.4 12.375
235U 0.2 0.7 109 80 0.160
234U 0.001 2.5 105 2.3 105 2.300
236U 0.003 2.3 107 2.4 103 0.072
∑
U 100 14.907
to uranium isotopes (14.9 Bq/mg, 36%), and for the residual part to beta
emitting short-life decay products (64%); among the transuranic elements
official information is available only for 239Pu (2.4 104 years), whose content
is estimated in 11 ppb [9]. DU specific activity is not substantially affected
by the declared amount of traces elements.
Metallic uranium has a high density (19 g/cm3), is pyrophoric and cheaper
than tungsten, and so has been attractive for U.S. Army for the production of
armor piercing ammunition since 1960s. Tungsten alloys have been preferred
up 1973, when a DU alloy with 0.75% of titanium (U-3/4Ti) was adopted for
ammunition made by a thin cylinder in DU alloy encased with lighter ma-
terial. Systems of DU weapons are owned or under development in different
countries (Saudi Arabia, France, United Kingdom, Israel, Pakistan, Russia,
Thailand and Turkey) [8].
Use of DU ammunition causes exposure of people soon and after, because
DU is dispersed as aerosol when the projectile strikes a hard target and
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then falls out on a limited area [7]. Contamination of all environmental
matrices takes place and health effects on people living nearby must be taken
in account, both for toxicological damage and for radiological risk. Among
different isotopes present in DU as declared, 238U ,234U and 235U are of concern
in risk assessment. For chemical hazard, kidney is identified as the target
organ, whatever the path of assumption [10]. Due to prevalent short-range
emitted radiation, the risk associated with exposure to ionizing radiation
mainly derives from ingestion and inhalation of radioactive material; external
irradiation from soil is less relevant.
3 Dispersion of DU in the environment and
exposure of the population
DU contained in projectiles, spread out as aerosol in air after striking the tar-
get, falls out producing environmental and food chain contamination. Possi-
ble occurring of chemical hazard and entity of radiation dose must be assessed
for people living in the area, taking into account both average and critical
group exposure.
DU concentration in the soil is the starting point; while waiting for mea-
surements of contamination in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia, we present
computed radiation doses and associated concentrations for different con-
taminated soil thickness, as soil mixing will extend the initial superficial
deposition to underlying layers in not undisturbed areas. Available soil mea-
sured DU concentrations in contaminated sites that we are aware of, are the
following:
• at Jefferson Proving Ground area an average
∑
U concentration of 318
Bq/kg was reported [11]; more recently a lower and an upper bound
of the concentration ranging from 592 Bq/kg to 13690 Bq/kg was also
measured [5];
• among the areas where the US personnel lived in the Gulf region (out-
side Iraq) the highest DU concentration (433 Bq/kg) was measured in
the Iraqi Tank Yard (the area where captured Iraqi equipment is stored
in Kuwait) [12];
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• in some sample analyzed by the RFY scientists a specific activity of
238U up to 2.35 105 Bq/kg was detected [13].
Following the hypothesis assumed in the BTF report, we have assumed as
a reference value a DU contamination of 1000 Bq/kg of soil over an area of
A = 10000 m2, in the hypothesis of 10 kg of DU entirely dispersed in the
impact as aerosol of uranium oxides, contaminating 1 cm of soil. With the
composition given in Table 1 initial activities per kg of soil for 238U , 235U ,
234U and 236U are respectively 830 Bq, 11 Bq, 154 Bq and 5 Bq.
Average effective dose is conservatively assessed using the residential
farmer scenario. The following pathways are considered: external irradia-
tion from soil, inhalation from resuspended dust, ingestion of contaminated
soil and water, ingestion of plants and animal products grown in site and
ingestion of fish grown in a pond contaminated by groundwater. Different
pathways are considered for plant contamination due to first root uptake (wa-
ter independent) and due to secondary root uptake from use of contaminated
water (water dependent). Radon inhalation is excluded. RESRAD 5.91 [14]
code is used, all parameters default except for the ones given in Table 2. Es-
timates of dose to individuals and population for risk in contaminated sites
have been performed by EPA employing primarily the code RESRAD (for
related work see [15, 16]).
RESRAD default libraries values have been corrected to give effective dose
[17] rather than equivalent effective dose [18]: due to the algorithm used by
RESRAD, anyway, values for external irradiation EG in Tables 4 and 5 have
been impossible to modify, and are approximate by 10% maximum defect.
In Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 we show average annual effective doses and corre-
sponding DU concentrations in water and vegetables for three different soil
thickness, respectively 1 cm, 10 cm and 20 cm. The following quantities are
given at different times, from the first year to about two hundred years after
maximum dose, for main pathways: the total dose (Etot), the dose from exter-
nal irradiation from the soil (EG), from inhalation of contaminated dust (EI),
from consumption of edible plants (water independent EP , water dependent
EwP ) and of water (EH2O).
The dependence of tmax and Emax on some hydrogeological parameters,
mainly affecting the water dependent pathways, is shown in Table 7 and
8. The maximum value of the dose is not much affected by most of the
parameters considered in Table 8 except Kd. This parameter is defined as
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Table 2: RESRAD parameters different from the default value.
this paper RESRAD def
indoor time fraction 0.6 0.5
outdoor time fraction 0.2 0.25
exposure duration 50 years 30 years
well pump intake depth 3 m 10 m
drinking water intake 730 l/y 510 l/y
the ratio of the mass of solute species observed in the solids per unit of dry
mass of the soil to the solute concentration in the liquids. A wide range has
been observed for uranium Kd values [19]. For largest value of Kd the DU is
retained in surface and does not reach at least within the first 1000 years the
watertable. A measurement of the local value of this parameter is therefore
necessary to reduce the uncertainty on the dose assessment.
Strong dependence of maximum inhalation dose has been found, as ex-
pected, on the dust loading parameter, as shown in Table 9.
As already outlined, presented doses and concentrations have been ob-
tained from an average value of soil contamination, in order to assess the
average exposure of population. Whatever the average value considered,
anyway, highly inhomogeneous soil concentrations must be expected in the
contaminated area, both for sparse aerosol deposition and for oxidation of
DU fragments: concentrations up to 12% in weight have been reported [20].
In order to assess the dose to critical population group, this must be taken in
account, especially if inhalation of soil was the critical pathway: inhalation
of 0.1 g of soil with maximum reported DU contamination, equal to 12 mg
DU, corresponds to 1.44 mSv; ingestion of 1 g of soil, equal to 120 mg DU,
corresponds to 0.08 mSv.
A scenario, in which permanence in dusting air and ingestion of soil are
possible, is the one for children playing with soil. From the presented dose
assessment and considerations children playing with soil may be identified as
the critical population group, with inhalation and/or ingestion of contami-
nated soil as critical pathway. Evidently, average and critical doses are some-
how competitive, because the higher fraction of DU is dispersed as aerosol,
the lower part of it can rest in soil as fragment, being presence of fragments
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Table 3: Effective doses (µSv) for contaminated soil thickness 1 cm. Etot,
EG, EI , EP , EH2O, E
w
P are the total dose, the ground, inhalation, plant
(water independent), water, plant (water independent) doses. The initial
contamination is assumed of 1000 Bq/kg over an area of A = 10000 m2.
The symbol - means doses less than 1 µSv. All not specified parameters as
in Table 2.
t(y) Emax EG EI EP EH2O E
w
P
0 4 4 - - - -
1 3 3 - - - -
3 - - - - - -
300 - - - - - -
485 4 - - - 4 -
500 4 - - - 4 -
700 - - - - - -
the main cause of hot spots in soil contamination.
It must be outlined that the amount of DU considered in the simulation
corresponds to 37 A-10 /GAU-8 ammunitions. According to the available
information, a much larger number of projectiles has been fired on each site
(between 50 and 2320, average 300) and up to now unknown is the extension
of targeted sites. Both for average and critical exposure, anyway, more realis-
tic dose assessment will be possible only when measured contamination data
will be known, scaling the values in the tables for the appropriate factor.
Increment of inhalation dose attributable to 239Pu presence in DU is
officially estimated in 14% [9]: with 11 ppb of 239Pu in DU RESRAD gives
a maximum dose increment of 0.6%.
4 Normative and recommendations framework
Before discussing compliance of average assessed doses and exposure with
international standards set to prevent from toxicological damage and limit
ionizing radiation risk, we shortly line out an aspect relative to radioprotec-
tion system, maybe useful even in wider considerations on risk.
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Table 4: Effective doses (µSv) for contaminated soil thickness 10 cm. All
not specified parameters as in Table 2.
t(y) Emax EG EI EP EH2O E
w
P
0 18 15 - 1 - -
1 17 14 - 1 - -
3 15 12 - 1 - -
10 9 8 - 1 - -
30 2 2 - - - -
100 - - - - - -
300 - - - - - -
486 44 - - - 41 2
500 44 - - - 41 2
700 - - - - - -
Due to accepted linear-no-threshold model for effects produced by ioniz-
ing radiation, justification of a practise has to be the first one posed, that is
if the population exposure from military use of DU is justified or not. Com-
parison between dose estimates in such a scenario and dose limits and dose
constraints stated by regulations is anyway useful, for a quantitative per-
ception of risk. In order to assess the need for remediation in contaminated
areas, once again the question of justification has to be considered; specific
reference levels, linked to the avertable annual dose, have to be defined by
national authorities. ”Generic reference levels ... should be used with great
caution” and their use ”should not prevent protective actions from being
taken to reduce ... dominant components [of existing annual dose]” [21]. We
next report a comment to assessed doses, comparing them with radiological
and toxicological reference values, in order not to hold the question narrowed
to exceeding of dose limits.
Values of annual dose in Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the same temporal shape,
with an initial prevalent dose from irradiation by soil and a maximum from
ingestion of contaminated drinking water occurring after about five hundreds
years, when contamination reaches the acquifer serving the population. Max-
imum dose, progressively increasing as inventary of DU increases, is always
lower than annual population limit (1 mSv/y), starts to be comparable with
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Table 5: Effective doses (µSv) for contaminated soil thickness 20 cm. All
not specified parameters as in Table 2.
t(y) Emax EG EI EP EH2O E
w
P
0 24 19 1 2 - -
1 23 18 1 2 - -
3 21 17 1 2 - -
10 17 13 - 2 - -
30 8 7 - 1 - -
100 1 1 - - - -
300 - - - - - -
499 87 - - - 82 4
700 1 - - - 1 -
Table 6: DU concentrations in the water CH2O and in the edible plants (water
dependent) CwP at the maximum dose time.
CH2O (Bq/l) C
w
P (Bq/kg)
1 cm 1.11 1.48
10 cm 1.15 1.85
20 cm 2.25 3.74
EPA cleanup limit criterion (150 µSv/y, [22]) for 20 cm depth. Exceeding of
dose constraint of 0.1 mSv/y indicated in [21] for longlived isotopes may not
be excluded. This in general happen only after long times, due to the low
mobility of the uranium oxides (the mean transit times for insoluble uranium
in the top 10 cm of soil range from 7.4 to 15.4 years with an average of 13.4
years [23]; soluble forms have a mean transit times of one month). At the
maximum dose time concentration of DU in the water reaches the provisional
value of WHO guideline for drinkable water (0.05 Bq/l [24]) already for 1
cm depth. The concentration of DU in leafy vegetables at time of maximum
dose ranges from 2 to 4 Bq/kg; no derived limit is defined for consumption
of dietary parts.
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Table 7: Effective doses for contaminated soil thickness 10 cm, unsaturated
zone thickness 3.90 m, for different values of the well pump intake depth
(WPID). (CH2O and C
w
P are the concentrations of DU in the water and in
the plants (water dep)). All not specified parameters as in Table 2.
WPID(m) tmax(y) Emax(µSv) CH2O(Bq/l) C
w
P (Bq/kg)
1 398 103 2.7 4.5
2 417 65 1.7 2.8
4 564 33 0.7 1.4
Table 8: Contaminated soil thickness 10 cm. All not specified parameters as
in Table 2.
tmax(y) Emax(µSv)
prec.rate (0.9− 1.1)m 537− 435 43.0− 44.1
watershed area (106 ± 105)m2 486 43.6
well pumping rate (200− 300)m3/y 486 43.6
distrib.coeff. Kd (20− 100)cm
3/g 215− 0 118− 19
Inhalation of highly contaminated soil may leave to exceeding of annual
dose limit, with possible occurring of toxicological damage: maximum al-
lowed concentration in air for workplaces stated by NRC, 45 µg/m3 for sol-
uble and 200 µg/m3 for insoluble uranium forms, would be exceeded if dust
loading was more than 1700 µg/m3, a high but not extreme value. Less im-
portant seems ingestion of contaminated soil, due to the lower value of dose
conversion factor with respect to the inhalation one. Anyway, ingestion of 1
g maximum contaminated soil would result in 120 mg DU ingestion, when
maximum daily ingestion of uranium, due to toxicological effects, was stated
in 150 mg by italian legislation till year 2000.
10
Table 9: Average dose from inhalation at t = 0 for different values of the
dust loading parameter. Contaminated soil thickness 10 cm. All not specified
parameters as in Table 2.
100 µg/m3 1 mg/m3 5 mg/m3
inhal. dose (µSv) - 3 16
5 Conclusions
DU contained in projectiles, spread out in air after striking the target, falls
out producing environmental and food chain contamination. Possible occur-
ring of chemical hazard and entity of radiation dose must be assessed for
different kind of exposure of people living in the area, taking into account
both average and critical group exposure. While waiting for measurements
of contamination in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia, we have computed ra-
diation doses and concentrations for different contaminated soil thickness, as
soil mixing will extend the initial superficial deposition to underlying layers
in not undisturbed areas.
In order to assess the average exposure of population, doses and con-
centrations have been obtained from an average value of soil contamination.
For the individuation of the critical group inhomogeneous soil concentration
has been considered. The presented dose assessment suggests a short term
exposure due to inhalation and/or ingestion of contaminated soil and a long
term exposure due to ingestion of contaminated water and food; the propa-
gation of the superficial contamination to the watertable critically depends
on various hydrogeological parameters to be evaluated on the site.
In sites targeted by DU munitions special cautions have to be adopted to
reduce unaware exposures and cleanup must be planned on the basis of the
measured concentrations.
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